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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001714

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SUBJECT: KARZAI NERVOUS ON PROVINCIAL SECURITY: RESURRECTS IDEA OF AUXILIARY POLICE, SWIPES AT PAKISTAN

REF: KABUL 1133

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Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE RICHARD NORLAND FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) In the wake of recent insurgent activity in the South, President Karzai is afraid he may be losing public confidence in his government's authority in rural provincial districts, and he is once again broaching the idea of raising informal auxiliary police units to provide security in certain districts. Karzai on April 15 convoked Charge, CFC-A Commanding General LTG Eikenberry and SIMO chief to a meeting with NSA Rassoul, NDS Chief Saleh, Uruzgan Governor Munib, Deputy NSA Ibrahim, Deputy Minister of Finance Sharani and Presidential Chief of Staff Ludin.

¶2. (C) Pointing to clashes with Taliban and other insurgents in the Panjwai District of Kandahar province and other southern districts, Karzai claimed the Afghan National Police training program is not delivering forces fast enough. He declared his intention to form auxiliary police units in vulnerable districts. Deputy Finance Minister Sharani, who had just spent three days in Kandahar assessing district police needs, reported that police forces needed to be doubled or quadrupled in size (100-200 policemen) and that more equipment, weapons and ammunition were required. Sharani said raising local forces could add \$25 million to the GOA annual budget, and that donor support would be required to avoid breaching IMF requirements. Karzai said he would find the money, "by hook or by crook." Karzai also criticized Pakistan for failing to stop the influx of insurgents who are attacking villages and burning schools and clinics (and he dismissed a possible meeting between Rassoul and his Pakistani counterpart as unlikely to produce results). He asked Charge to deliver a strong message to Washington on the need to address security in the districts.

¶3. (C) The American side shared Karzai's concern but pointed to drawbacks with the auxiliary police idea. LTG Eikenberry noted that not all districts face the same challenges, and thus the proposal to raise large numbers of local police in districts across the board was excessive. He emphasized that the problem was not

insufficient numbers of police, but their lack of quality. Without adequate leadership, he added, adding untrained police to the rolls could cause insecurity. The General said that as a first step, poor district and police chiefs must be rooted out. Charge observed that forming auxiliary police would represent a vote of no-confidence in existing national institutions, and could draw resources away from national programs. Karzai agreed to LTG Eikenberry's proposal to convene governors and police chiefs from key at-risk provinces (Kandahar, Uruzgan, Paktika, Konar, Nuristan and Zabul) to review the threat and available security resources. The meeting is scheduled for Monday, April 17. Karzai claimed he was unlikely to be dissuaded from pursuing the auxiliary police idea.

¶4. (C) Comment: It may not be coincidence that Karzai, just back from India, is spun up again on security and Pakistan. Nevertheless, attacks are up, most of them clearly with a cross-border dimension. Karzai is embarrassed and frustrated by Taliban activity, which he fears is eroding confidence in his government. "We are simply not (present) in the districts," he confessed. In a meeting with UK Ambassador and Charge just prior to this one, he also stressed the need for more economic development and alternative livelihood funding in provinces where poppy eradication is taking place (he cited Panjwai District here too). Karzai seeks a near term solution to a threat that will take several years to diminish. However, raising auxiliary police risks re-armng militias and diverting resources from development of national security institutions. After a generation of warfare, Karzai and most Afghanistan leaders do not fully comprehend the importance of a credible national army or police. Accordingly, they tend to fall back on familiar tribal

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or militia approaches to dealing with threats to security. We will work to find pragmatic, flexible solutions, while not subtracting from our current strategy of delivering the respected, affordable and sustainable Afghan National Security Forces essential to our combined success.

Norland